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Abstract The year 2012 was the 30th anniversary of William H. Riker’s modern 
classic Liberalism against populism (1982) and is marked by the present special 
issue.  In this introduction, we seek to identify some core elements and evaluate 
the current status of the Rikerian research program and its empirical 
applications.  Special attention is given to three phenomena and their possible 
empirical manifestations: The instability of social choice in the form of (1) the 
possibility of majority cycles, (2) the non-robustness of social choices given 
alternative voting methods, and (3) the possibility of various forms of 
manipulation of the decisions (heresthetics).  These topics are then connected to 
the contributions to the current special issue. 
 
Keywords: Social choice; Condorcet’s Paradox; voting theory; voting 
paradoxes; preferences; heresthetics. 
 
[Even] if an omniscient observer, call him Zeus, knew the true tastes of every 
voter, it would still be impossible for him to predict the social choice or the 
product of aggregating preferences unless he also knew the method of 
aggregation.  This means that the social choice depends not simply on the wills 
of individuals, but also on the method used to summarize these wills.   
 
William H. Riker (1982: 31) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 2012, it was 30 years since the publication of the modern classic, 
Liberalism against populism: A confrontation between the theory of 
democracy and the theory of social choice, by the US political scientist 
William H. Riker (1920-1993).  The book has since provided more 
than a generation of political scientists and economists with an 
introduction to the concepts and results of social choice theory—
and, perhaps most importantly, a systematic confrontation of the 
former with empirical case studies; it also drew considerable 
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reactions, both favorable and unfavorable.1  The year 2012, however, 
was also the anniversary (the 50th) of another of Riker’s books, the 
even more influential A theory of political coalitions, one of the first 
applications of game theory to political processes (Riker 1962).  Both 
works became very widely cited2 and contributed to making Riker 
one of the most influential political scientists of the 20th and early 
21st centuries.3 
In these and other works, Riker brought rationality and game 
theory to political science, and to some extent also political science 
and institutions to public choice; indeed he was “the only well-
known political scientist among the founders of rational choice” 
(Mitchell 1999: 238).4  Riker was a founding member (1964) and early 
                                           
1 Two distinguished students of Riker’s view Liberalism against populism as his 
most seminal work (Bueno de Mesquita and Shepsle 2001).  Looking at the 
number of citations relative to the age of the publication, the book certainly is 
the most influential single work by Riker, cf. Maske and Durden (2003: 193ff). 
2 In 2013 Google Scholar counted Liberalism against populism as having been cited 
almost 2,300 times (ca. 750 times going by the Social Science Citation Index).  
His seminal article in American Political Science Review on disequilibrium in 
majority decision-making (Riker 1980) was in many ways a precursor to the 
1982 book and had in 2013 been cited almost 900 times (ca. 300 citations in 
SSCI).  Riker’s direct follow-up to the book, the less technical and more popular 
The art of political manipulation (Riker 1986), had been cited ca. 1,250 times.  
Together the citations of two of these three matches Riker’s most cited work, A 
theory of political coalitions (ca. 3,150 citations).  For an earlier citation analysis of 
Riker’s works (using only SSCI data), see Maske and Durden (2003).   
3 Shortly after his death the editors of the pluralistic, multidisciplinary New 
Handbook of Political Science (Goodin and Klingemann 1996) estimated that 
across all the sub-disciplines of political science Riker shared a third place in 
terms of citations, along with Gabriel Almond and Robert Dahl.  Quite 
remarkably Riker’s own student, Kenneth Shepsle, beat him, sharing second 
place with Seymour Martin Lipset, with Sidney Verba in first place.  Riker was 
also judged to be one of a small group of “highly visible integrators” making an 
impact across a wide set of sub-disciplines within political science.  (See Goodin 
and Klingemann 1996: 31, 34 and 41). 
4 On the life and academic contributions of Riker more broadly, see, e.g., 
Mitchell (1994); Bueno de Mesquita and Shepsle (2001); McLean (2002); Aldrich 
(2004); McLean (2008). 
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president of the Public Choice Society (1966-1967), and, indeed, the 
first political scientist to hold that position. He subsequently served 
on the editorial board of this journal for years and contributed a 
number of articles to it, including “The place of political science in 
public choice” (Riker 1988) and the for present purposes very 
relevant article “Plurality and runoff systems and number of 
candidates” (Wright and Riker 1989). 
Together these facts make a fitting opportunity to publish a 
special issue devoted to Rikerian perspectives on social choice—first 
and foremost the issue of how to apply the frequently extremely 
abstract concepts of social choice theory to situations of real, day-to-
day working political decision-making.  In order to do so the 
present article will, first, identify and recapitulate some of the most 
important insights of potential importance for democracy coming 
out of Liberalism against populism (section 2), notably with respect to 
the possibility of “cyclical” majorities, the robustness of social 
choices relative to alternative voting procedures, and the 
consequences of various forms of “manipulation” (heresthetics).  
Subsequently, we introduce the contributions to this special issue in 
the light of how they relate to the aforementioned topics (section 3).  
Finally, we will say a few words about what this tells us about the 
life and possible future directions of the Rikerian program (section 
4). 
 
 
2. Rikerian perspectives on empirical social choice 
 
William H. Riker’s works spanned many fields and themes, and his 
chief success academically was his large part in being responsible 
for introducing game theory into political science, as “positive 
political theory” or “formal political theory”.5  However, for the 
present purposes we will limit the focus to his work on social choice 
                                           
5 On Riker’s role as the founder of the “Rochester School” or “positive political 
theory”, see Mitchell (1988) and Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita (1999). 
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analysis and, more narrowly, to three questions or themes 
emanating from Liberalism against populism and central to both 
Riker’s legacy and the analysis of how democracy works in those 
situations wherein three or more decision-makers are to choose 
between three or more alternatives.  Riker summarized what he felt 
were the central insights: 
 
[I have shown] that no method of voting could be said to 
amalgamate individual judgments truly and fairly because every 
method violates some reasonable canon of fairness and accuracy.  All 
voting methods are therefore in some sense morally imperfect.  
Furthermore, these imperfect methods can produce different 
outcomes from the same profile of individual judgments.  Hence it 
follows that sometimes—and usually we never know for sure just 
when—the social choice is as much an artifact of morally imperfect 
methods as it is of what people truly want. (Riker 1982: 115) 
 
From this perspective, and the book in general, three separate 
analytical issues or possibilities emerge: 
 
1. Cyclical majorities: The possibility that there may be no 
alternative that cannot be beaten by at least one other 
alternative in pairwise comparisons. 
2. Robustness: The possibility that the outcome of a decision 
process may depend not simply on the preference profiles of 
the decision makers, but also on the procedure/method chosen 
to aggregate those preferences into a collective choice. 
3. Heresthetics: The possibility that one or more decision-makers 
can determine or manipulate the context, structure or 
procedure of a decision to such an extent that it changes the 
probability of the outcome. 
 
In the following we will consider these in greater detail. 
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2.1. Cyclical majorities 
 
The perhaps most important problem, or at least the starting point 
that occupied Riker, was the so-called Condorcet Paradox: The 
possibility of  “cyclical” preferences in collective decisions, whereby 
A beats B, and B beats C, while C beats A, and there accordingly is 
no stable equilibrium generated by the preferences alone.  The 
notion of cycles has been known since at least the French 
mathematicians Condorcet and Borda, but the insight may even be 
older (cf. McLean and Hewitt 1994; McLean and Urken 1995).  In 
modern social science the possibility of a cyclical majority was made 
famous by a small group of economists: Kenneth Arrow in his Social 
Choice and Individual Values and more indirectly by the seminal 
works of Duncan Black, Anthony Downs and James Buchanan and 
Gordon Tullock (Black 1948; Arrow [1951] 1963; Downs 1957; 
Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 2004).  However, it was Riker who 
introduced the concept to political scientists (Riker 1958) and 
subsequently spent many years studying the theoretical and 
empirical implications of the paradox, with Liberalism against 
populism summarizing his position (up to that point). 
But how often are preferences in a group cyclical such that 
majority rule is indecisive?  The first of many analyses—on which 
Riker built—were occupied with the theoretical possibility and 
argued that mathematically speaking, and with everything else 
being equal, the probability of cycles occurring in the preferences of 
decision-makers (voters, politicians, and so on) could be expected to 
increase with the number of alternatives and/or the number of 
decision-makers (e.g., Campbell and Tullock 1965; Garman and 
Kamien 1968; Niemi and Weisberg 1968; DeMeyer and Plott 1970; 
Jamison 1975; Gehrlein and Fishburn 1976; Dobra and Tullock 1981). 
Calculations and simulations demonstrated that with assumptions 
of strict preferences and of “impartial culture” the probability of a 
cycle in a group’s preferences—with every preference ordering 
being equal likely—would soon approach 1.  This was, to a large 
extent, the point argued in Liberalism against populism: Cycles in 
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reality are almost universal—but often we do not see them, until we 
look for them, and when we do they may be hard to detect because 
we lack reliable information about individuals’ preference orderings 
over the relevant alternatives. 
More recent research has questioned this view, by arguing that 
even relatively small changes in the assumptions—e.g., allowing for 
indifference between alternatives and with preference homogeneity 
among groups of voters—may significantly affect these calculations.  
In fact, the probability of cycles may fall and become rather rare 
(Jones et al. 1995; Timpone and Taber 1998; cf. Regenwetter et al. 
2006). 
But these are all mostly theoretical inquiries.  Riker’s focus in 
Liberalism against populism (1982), as well as again in The art of 
political manipulation (1986) and other works, was to a large extent to 
present detailed case studies of actual examples of cycles (and other 
social choice phenomena) and their possible consequences.  This line 
of research had been spearheaded by Riker himself quite early; in 
fact, he identified the first two real-world examples of the Condorcet 
Paradox (Riker 1958; Riker 1965).  In order to illustrate this type of 
analysis, let us consider a recent case identified by Warren D. Smith, 
who analyzed apparent voter preferences and the outcome of the 
presidential election of Romania 2009,6 cf. Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
The Romanian presidential elections follow a plurality runoff 
model, whereby the winner is the candidate who in a first round 
wins an absolute majority of the votes cast or, alternatively, if such a 
winner does not exist, the two candidates with the most votes go on 
to a second round, where by definition a simple majority rule 
winner will emerge.  However, since the procedure does not allow 
for a pairwise comparison of the candidates (which rarely is the case 
                                           
6 See Smith (2009).  Smith’s analysis has only been published on-line; all of the 
information presented here is derived from that presentation. 
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in the real world), or for individual voters to rank all alternatives, a 
candidate may in practice be elected who actually is not the 
Condorcet winner, i.e., is not able to beat all other candidates in 
pairwise comparisons, and where this would not be visible to the 
voters. 
Table 1 reports the outcomes of the 2009 election, as summarized 
by Smith (2009) and the official Romanian authorities.  No less than 
11 candidates ran in the first round but none obtained a majority; 
the plurality winner (Basescu) and the runner-up (Geoana) 
accordingly proceeded to a runoff, where the former very narrowly 
beat the latter (50.33% to 49.66%).7 
Election results rarely allow observers to deduce with any 
certainty whether the Condorcet Paradox is present in an election, 
but during the campaign a series of polls were taken pitting the 
leading candidates against each other in pairwise contests.  
Considering these Smith calculated the head-to-head comparisons 
of Basescu versus Geoana, Basescu versus Antonescu, Geoana 
versus Antonescu, Basescu versus Oprescu and Geoana versus 
Oprescu, taking the sample sizes and levels of statistical significance 
of the vote shares into consideration.  Smith concludes that it is very 
likely (p > 0.99) that one or more cycles were present in the collective 
preferences of the Romanian voters (with › meaning “… preferred 
by a majority to …”): 
 
(1) Antonescu › Basescu › Geoana › Antonescu 
(2) Obrescu › Basescu › Geoana › Obrescu 
 
Both the official winner of the runoff (Basescu) and the runner-up 
(Geoana) accordingly were “members” of at least one cyclical 
majority.  In other words, the actual winner (Basescu) was less 
preferred by a majority of the voters than at least two other 
candidates (Antonescu and Obrescu), and no matter which one of 
                                           
7 There may have been fraud involved in the election, but for the present 
purposes these official results have been treated as the correct ones. 
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four candidates might have won the election, at least one other 
candidate would have beaten him in a pairwise contest.  Smith also 
estimates that it is very likely that the election had no Condorcet 
Winner at all (p > 0.95), but if there was one it was either Antonescu 
or Oprescu—both of who received very small vote shares.8 
In that sense the 2009 Romanian presidential election is a real-
world example of the relevance of the type of voting paradoxes 
Riker encouraged social scientists to investigate.  But is it a rare 
example or is it just rare that we are able to observe it? 
 
2.2. Robustness 
 
When it came to the application of social choice theory to 
democratic decision-making, the second main issue in which Riker 
can be seen as having been interested in Liberalism against populism 
was how large of an (independent) effect institutions may have on 
the outcomes.  Or, phrased differently, how “robust” the outcomes 
are relative to the preferences of the decision-makers given changes 
in voting procedures: “Different choices from identical values”, as 
Riker (1982: 21-40) titled Chapter 2 of Liberalism against populism. 
Given the very large—potentially infinite—number of alternative 
ways of aggregating preferences, it follows intuitively that different 
methods and procedures may result in different outcomes, 
depending on how preferences are distributed among the decision-
makers and how different rules may operate on them. 
The most elementary illustration of the problem is the procedure 
of voting on three (or more) alternatives, wherein three (or more) 
voters find themselves as part of a cycle.  If, for example, A can beat 
B, and B can beat C and C can beat A, then the only features 
determining what the outcome will be are the number of times votes 
are taken and the order in which the alternatives are voted on (cf. 
                                           
8 See Smith (2009) for further details, calculations and reservations about the 
conclusions. 
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Riker 1982: 138ff).  So, whether a decision involves one or more 
rounds of voting (and how many and in what order the 
comparisons are made), such as happens in a number of electoral or 
legislative systems, may conceivably affect the outcome, even if 
preferences are unchanged and decision-makers behave honestly 
(i.e., vote strictly in accordance with their preferences).  It turns out 
that there is no guarantee that any method will end in the Condorcet 
Winner being chosen, if such an alternative exists (cf. Riker 1982: 69-
81, 138ff).  
If the procedure is not simply one of voting up/down or for one of 
a pair, but involves ranking or scoring of the alternatives, then the 
effect may be even clearer.  Riker and a number of other scholars 
have for illustrative purposes produced theoretical preference 
profiles for which the application of different methods—say, e.g., 
pairwise comparisons, plurality, Borda count, approval voting, 
additive and multiplicative “utilitarian” scoring methods, and so 
forth ad infinitum—all produce different results, in terms of chosen 
alternatives or ranking of alternatives (Riker 1982: 36ff;  Nurmi 1987; 
Malkevitch 1990; Shepsle and Bonchek 1997).9 
Such non-robustness of social choice does not even presuppose 
any intransitivities in the preference orderings or the absence of a 
Condorcet winner.  Almost no matter the number of alternatives 
and configuration of preferences, it may be theoretically possible to 
devise agendas or voting methods that will lead to diverging 
outcomes even when preferences are unchanged (Saari 1994).  But 
how widespread or relevant is this phenomenon in real life? As in 
the case of the calculation of the probabilities of cyclical majorities, it 
may very well be that it is a theoretical possibility of little practical 
relevance.  Riker (1982: 29-36) himself retold the instructive real-
world example of scientists trying to determine the right spacecraft 
trajectories by ranking the alternatives (Dyer and Miles 1976).  
Applying four different (but not excessively so) voting procedures 
                                           
9 See also Kurrild-Klitgaard (2005: 124-38).  For presentations of these and other 
voting methods and their properties when choosing between more than two 
alternatives, see, e.g., Riker (1982: 66-101); Nurmi (1987). 
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(including pairwise comparisons) to the rankings resulted in two 
methods picking one set of trajectories, while two other methods 
resulted in the choice of another set of trajectories; plurality voting 
would have resulted in a third outcome.  Each method also resulted 
in different rankings of the sets of trajectories. 
The case of the Romanian 2009 presidential election considered 
above (Table 1) illustrates both the theoretical insights, but also how 
difficult this type of research is in practice.  While data exist 
showing the results of pairwise comparisons in polls, there is no 
information available that would allow one to assign cardinal scores 
to the alternatives or even to determine their ordinal rankings. For 
that reason, we cannot in this case simulate what the results would 
have been, had other voting methods been used for aggregating or 
summarizing the same preferences.  However, it is obvious that the 
vote difference between Basescu and Geoana was so small that some 
ranking procedure might very well have resulted in the choice of the 
latter—especially given that the candidates Antonescu, Marko and 
Becali all endorsed Geoana in the runoff (Smith 2009).  Depending 
on the shapes and intensities of the preferences of the voters, it is not 
even impossible that Antonescu or Obrescu, or yet other, seemingly 
unpopular candidates, might have won if one or another method 
had been adopted.  Looking at polling data, Smith has estimated 
that Oprescu with high probability would have won had so-called 
approval voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978) been used and that he 
might have been the winner under some “utilitarian” scoring 
method.  In other words, Basescu, Geoana and Oprescu might each 
have won using different, uncontroversial voting methods, even if 
the voters’ preferences remained unchanged. 
A large number of examples of such non-robustness of social 
choices have been identified over the years, including, e.g., US 
presidential primaries and elections (Riker 1982: 22ff; Mueller 2003: 
157f; Miller 2011, 2012), elections and government formations in 
parliamentary democracies (e.g., Riker 1982: 25-28; Härd 2000; Van 
Deemen and Vergunst 1998; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2008, 2013; Miller 
2013), and public spending policies (Kurrild-Klitgaard 2005: 138-46). 
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This field of research certainly shows no signs of having problems 
finding illustrative examples of social choice “failures”, although it 
may often be challenging to find the necessary “hard” data (Riker 
1982: 29).  The real question is what more general inferences and 
conclusions to draw from this line of research: Does it tell us 
anything about the conditions (such as procedures, preference 
profiles and the dimensions of the choice space) under which social 
choices are not robust? 
 
2.3. Manipulation 
 
The third Rikerian point identified here follows almost immediately 
from the issue of whether or not social choices are robust to changes 
in the procedures: That political actors may seek to use (and 
possibly abuse) the rules of the game to produce other results than 
what otherwise would have been the outcome(s).  Such behavior 
may overall be classified as “manipulation”, although it should be 
stressed that there is not (necessarily) anything illegal or “wrong” 
about such behavior; the point is simply that the process is being 
“taken” elsewhere than one would have expected from a mere 
aggregation of sincere voter preferences.  In Liberalism against 
populism, Riker summarized how he saw the implications of that 
possibility: these are “either that power is concentrated in society or 
that any system of voting can be manipulated to produce outcomes 
advantageous to the manipulators or at least different from 
outcomes in the absence of manipulation”(Riker 1982: 137). 
In his important contributions to the literature, Riker came to 
identify three different forms of “heresthetics”(Riker 1986: 147-52; cf. 
Riker 1982: 137ff).  First and foremost, is the possibility of direct and 
overt manipulation by those who can use the formalities of a 
procedure to control a decision-making process (Riker 1982: 138ff, 
169-81).  To see the point one needs only to consider it as a direct 
extension of the point about (non-)robustness: If different 
procedures and/or aggregation methods may lead to different 
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outcomes, even when individual preference profiles are unchanged, 
then an actor with an ability to steer the voting process may do so to 
his own advantage.  Riker saw this as a natural extension of the 
“chaos results” demonstrating that, except in the rare and fragile 
examples of a pure preference equilibrium, simple majority voting 
may, when the agenda is appropriately manipulated, lead to any 
possible outcome (Riker 1982: 237; cf. Plott 1967; McKelvey 1976; 
Schofield 1978).  In such circumstances, it really is the collective 
choice institution rather than individual preferences that determine 
outcomes (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; McKelvey and Ordeshook 
1984; Shepsle and Weingast 2012). Consider again the case of the 
2009 Romanian presidential election: If one particular method of 
electing presidents is likely to benefit one party at the expense of its 
competitor(s), then it will be attractive for that party to try to change 
the rules of the voting system (or their application) to achieve the 
desired result.  Such manipulation may not always be possible: It 
requires information about the preferences of all decision-makers 
(voters), as well as the practical ability to change the rules.  
However, thinking of electoral laws in this perspective may 
enlighten our understanding of why some countries revise their 
electoral laws frequently (e.g., Italy since the 1990s) as well as why 
some countries rarely do so (e.g., Britain and the United States)—
with “gerrymandering” of electoral districts being the perhaps most 
well-known example.  In other settings, e.g., parliaments or 
committees, “agenda control” (as it is frequently referred to) may be 
much easier, and Riker himself presented case studies of, e.g., that 
power in the Roman senate and the US Congress (Riker 1982: 173f, 
193ff, 1986: 78-88, 129-41).10  More generally, Charles Plott has in 
case studies and experiments demonstrated how it is practically 
possible for an agenda setter to generate almost any outcome 
                                           
10 A very obvious (but far from isolated) example derived from the US Congress 
was the case of the impeachment of President Clinton, wherein the House 
leadership simply refused to allow a vote on an alternative they knew would 
pass (Kurrild-Klitgaard 1999). 
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(Levine and Plott 1977; Plott and Levine 1978; cf. Riker 1982: 174ff, 
1986: 18-33). 
Whereas agenda control presupposes privileged positions or at 
least extensive information and possibly considerable political 
“capital”, there is a second form of heresthetics open to everyone in 
a voting process: To vote “insincerely” (strategically) relative to 
what a simple expression of one’s sincere preferences would have 
dictated, namely when one expects that this may increase one’s 
expected utility from the process.11  Building on the seminal results 
of Gibbard, Satterthwaite et al. Riker concluded that any (non-
dictatorial) voting method may be manipulated by strategic voting, 
and it does seem likely that strategic voting occurs quite frequently 
(Riker 1982: 141ff, 167f; cf. Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975). 
Consider again the case of the 2009 Romanian presidential 
election (Table 1).  If the voters who voted for Antonescu in the first 
round are assumed to have ranked him as their first choice, we can 
at least hypothesize that Geoana was their second choice; this may 
be plausible given that Antonescu endorsed Geoana in the second 
round.  If these voters all had switched from their (presumed) 
sincere first choice by voting strategically for Geoana in the first 
round, he would have won in the second round rather than Basescu.  
This is, of course, just a hypothetical scenario, but the world of 
politics is seemingly full of voters and politicians, who occasionally 
vote for alternatives other than the one they in their hearts would 
most like to win.  Riker himself supplied examples of strategic 
voting derived from, among others, US primary elections (Riker 
1982: 146ff), the Constitutional convention (Riker 1986: 89-102, 103-
05, 1987), labor union elections (Riker 1982: 151ff), legislation before 
the US House of Representatives (Riker 1982: 152ff, 1986: 114-28) 
and the Roman senate (ibid.: 78-88). 
 Finally, there is a third form of “manipulation” that Riker 
associated with strategic control of the “dimensions” of ideological 
                                           
11 Strategic (insincere) voting is characterized by some voters casting ballots for 
lower ranked candidates or alternatives in order to avoid even worse outcomes 
(for them) that otherwise will be selected on the basis of the “setter’s” agenda. 
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space and to which he devoted a large part of his research in his 
later years (Riker 1982: 208ff, 1984, 1987, 1993, 1996).  Manipulation 
of policy space refers to the strategy of introducing new issues into 
the political process to such an extent that old equilibria are 
overturned: Whoever is the all-important median voter in a one-
dimensional setting may be much less important if the political 
arena suddenly has two (or more) dimensions.  Previous majority 
coalitions will split and new ones will form.  This type of 
manipulation—which Riker (1986: 150f) suggested may be the most 
common and indeed very frequently observed form — is different 
from mere rhetoric; it works by introducing new alternatives of high 
salience, e.g., by proposing “killer amendments” or new candidates.  
The most well-known example given by Riker—and possibly also 
the most controversial—is his suggestion that by placing slavery on 
the political agenda, Lincoln undermined the Democrat Party’s 
political dominance (Riker 1982: 214-32, 1986: 1-9). Other examples 
include constitutional reform (Riker 1986: 10-17), gerrymandering 
(Riker 1986: 66-77) and parliamentary amendments (Riker 1986: 114-
28). 
Research in this area is perhaps even more difficult than in the 
case of cyclical majorities, because the scholar will need information 
not only about the preferences of the decision makers but also about 
the intentions of those very politicians who are trying to do one 
thing by pretending they are doing something else. 
 
 
3. The present special issue 
 
All in all, Riker used the insights summarized above to conclude 
that democracy seen as a Rousseauvian manifestation of a “will of 
the people” is a mirage (cf. Riker 1982: 11-14, 233-53).  Personally, he 
favored what he associated with a Madisonian view and termed a 
“liberal” view of democracy: “The function of voting is to control 
officials, and no more” (Riker 1982: 9; emphasis in original). 
Democracy simply will have to suffice to be seen as a method of 
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controlling officials by subjecting their tenure in office to periodic 
electoral tests.12 
 This, more normative conclusion, as well as some of the empirics 
of the cases considered by Riker (1982, 1986), have on occasion been 
submitted to severe criticism (e.g., Green and Shapiro 1994; Mackie 
2003; cf. McLean 2002).  For the present purposes we shall not 
consider the first, normative issue, but rather focus on the latter, i.e., 
the extent to which Riker’s research on social choice has fruitful 
empirical applications and perspectives.  To do so, papers for this 
special issue were invited from a number of European and North 
American economists and political scientists interested in Rikerian 
themes—counting among them several of William Riker’s former 
students and colleagues. 
In the special issue’s lead article, “On the empirical relevance of 
Condorcet’s Paradox”, Adrian Van Deemen surveys the many studies 
of the empirical occurrence (or non-occurrence) of Condorcet cycles, 
and doing so he extends and supplements earlier surveys (e.g., 
Gehrlein 1983, 2006; Gehrlein and Lepelley 2011).  Van Deemen 
demonstrates that in terms of the sheer number of studies 
addressing the paradox’s empirical frequency, scholarly interest has 
increased markedly In the now 60 years of research, the first 30 
years produced 10 studies; the next 30 years saw a further 37 studies 
appearing.  He finds that Condorcet’s Paradox occurs in about 9% to 
10% of the 265 collective choices investigated—a frequency he views 
as non-negligible, although quite far from Riker’s (1982) claim that 
the paradox is virtually omnipresent.  The “evidence is insufficient 
either to confirm or to refute the statement that the paradox is 
empirically relevant”, Van Deemen concludes.  He also notes that 
mostly regular voter preferences have been observed in the real-
world elections that have been investigated, but that relatively few 
studies deal with collective decision-making processes in smaller 
groups, such as, e.g., committees, boards, government cabinets and 
party leaderships. 
                                           
12 Cf. Federalist #51, in Hamilton, Jay and Madison [1787] 2001. 
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Malthe Munkøe provides new empirical research on the latter: In 
“Cycles and instability in politics: Evidence from the 2009 Danish 
municipal elections” he examines a number of cases of the selection 
of mayors following the Danish 2009 local elections.  Munkøe finds 
four instances (out of 97) wherein the preferences of the political 
parties over who should be selected as city mayor is likely to have 
been cyclical and for which the selection process was characterized 
by both strategic behavior and instability. 
But given that voting paradoxes may occur and prevent collective 
choices being made in a coherent way, will some methods be better 
at picking the “right” alternative, given some normative democratic 
standard?  Florenz Plassmann and Nic Tideman consider this issue in 
their contribution, “Which voting rule is most likely to choose the 
“best” candidate?”  Using a spatial model of voting that is capable 
of simulating voting data with the same statistical structure as data 
from actual elections, they investigate the frequencies with which 14 
voting rules chose this candidate as the winner. The Black rule (i.e., 
the Condorcet Winner if one exists, otherwise the Borda Winner) 
tends to perform better than the other rules, especially in elections 
with few voters. Three methods, including plurality voting, tend to 
perform worse than the other 11 rules, especially in elections with 
many voters.  
Keith L. Dougherty, Brian Pitts, Justin Moeller and Robi Ragan 
consider a related topic in their paper titled, “An experimental study 
of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule”, wherein they 
use laboratory experiments to test whether a rule of unanimity or 
simple majority is best for producing Pareto optimal outcomes.  
Across a set of alternative specifications, their results favor majority 
rule.  Simple plurality rule is often found to be problematic in 
practice, even if it is easy to understand and easy to implement. 
Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard in his paper, “Picking a loser? A social 
choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975”, 
supplies a Rikerian analysis of the potential inability of the 
government formation process in Denmark’s parliamentary system 
to ensure the selection of a Condorcet Winner.  He demonstrates 
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that the de facto choice in the 1975 process of assembling a governing 
majority – the plurality rule winner – most likely was ranked fourth 
out of five (or second of three) in the collective preferences of the 
members of parliament. 
Several papers examine aspects of “heresthetics” in collective 
decision-making.  In “Insincere voting under the successive 
procedure”, Bjørn Erik Rasch considers, as the title suggests, the so-
called “successive procedure” for legislative voting used in some 
parliaments, which differs from the sequential “amendment 
procedure” typically used in the United States and analyzed in-
depth by Riker and many others.  Looking at data from Norwegian 
parliaments from 1989 to 2011, Rasch finds that use of the procedure 
in question seems to make strategic voting rare.  Mogens N. Pedersen, 
in the best Rikerian tradition, examines a specific historical vote in 
his paper, “A Danish killer amendment — when judicial review was 
banned from the 1849 Constitution”, and finds that the possibility of 
judicial review of legislation by the Danish Supreme Court most 
likely was “killed” by the introduction of a intentionally 
manipulative amendment proposed by a shrewd politician. 
Another set of papers in this special issue consider specific 
collective decisions (or sets of such) derived from a range of 
empirical settings: Elections, parliaments or other institutions and 
dealing with questions of how differences in distributions of 
preferences and in institutional arrangements may affect 
interactions and outcomes.  Nicholas Miller, in “The Alternative Vote 
and Coombs Rule versus First-Past-the-Post: A social choice analysis 
of simulated data based on English elections, 1992–2010”, applies 
numerical simulations to study Rikerian robustness given three 
alternative voting rules.  By looking at survey data from 20 years of 
general elections in Britain, Miller finds, inter alia, that the Liberals 
would benefit from a move to the Alternative Vote (AV) or the 
Coombs rule—which is a good explanation for why a majority has 
not been found in favor of abolishing first-past-the-post as the status 
quo voting rule.  He also finds that the latter rule is the least 
Condorcet efficient of three: In roughly a quarter of the cases looked 
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at, plurality rule does not result in the election of a Condorcet 
Winner, while AV and Coombs pick the “right” outcome in close to 
100% of the cases. 
Maria Gallego, Norman Schofield, Kevin McAlister and Jee Seon Jeon, 
in “The variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 Canadian 
election”, consider the question of where in policy space political 
parties locate themselves and use the 2004 election in Canada as a 
case with which to construct a stochastic electoral model. In 
”Modeling the effects of changing issue salience in two-party 
competition”, Scott L. Feld, Samuel Merrill III and Bernard Grofman 
investigate party competition and, in particular, how changes in the 
weighting of issue salience can lead to interchanges in candidates’ 
majorities, even though candidate positions remain fixed. When that 
happens competition over the salience of issue dimensions can, 
under certain circumstances, be crucial for determining election 
outcomes. They demonstrate the empirical relevance of the results 
with data from the 2000 US presidential election.  John Aldrich, Jason 
Reifler and Michael C. Munger also look at preferences in their paper, 
“Sophisticated and myopic? Citizen preferences for Electoral 
College reform”, which raises the issue of how the institutions 
governing elections may affect the outcomes of collective choices.  
Considering survey data, they find, among other things, that US 
voters’ preferences over Electoral College reform (winner-takes-all 
versus “proportional” allocation of electors) are influenced by a 
combination of their partisan preferences and expectations about 
how various reforms may influence later election outcomes.  The 
authors suggest that good reasons exist for believing that voters 
behave strategically not only when they vote for candidates, but also 
when evaluating alternative electoral schemes, thus confirming 
Rikerian analysis. 
In “Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009”, 
Steven Brams, Gustavo Camilo and Alexandra D. Franz look at data 
from the United States’ highest court and investigate the dynamics 
of sub-coalitions and majority coalitions to identify "kingmakers" 
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and "leaders" on the court, as well as how some justices have shifted 
ideologically over time. 
Finally, a group of papers take up Riker’s (1964) analysis of 
federalism as a way of making social choices a perspective he 
continued to adopt in his normative discussion of “liberal”, 
Madisonian democracy (Riker 1982: 233ff).  In ”Equilibrium 
institutions: the federal-proportional trade-off”, Josep M. Colomer 
argues that while multiple equilibrium sets of institutions are 
conceivable, each involves some trade-off between the size of the 
country, the territorial structure of subnational governments, if any, 
and the electoral system in place. He concludes that the larger the 
area of a country, the more important is federalism in comparison to 
the other, more centralized governance arrangements. The 
explanatory power of the model is positively tested with all current 
durable democratic countries and illustrated the context of various 
case studies.  In “Institutions, information, and faction: An 
experimental test of Riker’s federalism thesis for political parties”, 
John Aldrich, Michael C. Munger and Jason Reifler investigate Riker’s 
view of the US federal structure as being a “bargain” between 
national, state and local governments in terms of the division of 
power in partisan control.  Using data from a survey-based 
experiment, they offer an empirical investigation of Rikerian 
insights and find that voters’ views on reform of primary elections 
towards the so-called “blanket primary” are influenced by 
information about that institution’s effects.  The findings strongly 
support the claim that an understanding of the implications of the 
federal “bargain” condition strategic behavior of voters. 
 
 
4. Conclusion and perspectives 
 
Over the last several decades, Riker’s work in Liberalism against 
populism has been challenged by a number of prominent critics 
(Green and Shapiro 1994; Mackie 2003), essentially arguing—among 
other points—that the program is irrelevant empirically.  Contrary 
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to such generalizations, the research included in the present special 
issue demonstrates that 30 years after the publication of Liberalism 
against Populism the Rikerian research program is not only alive and 
well but producing fresh and fruitful insights (cf. McLean 2008). 
At the same time it bears noting that the long search for cyclical 
preferences and voting cycles perhaps may be stalling somewhat 
(even if the number of studies is not in visible decline), possibly due 
to an emerging understanding that the marginal payoff to 
additional study is small.  We now know—contrary to the perhaps 
naïve “populist” theories of democracy of earlier times—that cycles 
may exist and therefore should be taken seriously as possibilities—
but we also know that they seem to be occurring much less 
frequently than perhaps first thought by social choice theorists. 
Accordingly, the research program has been moving on: To the 
study of effects of alternative methods of social choice; to the 
strategic behavior of political actors; to the application of such 
insights to the evaluation and design of alternative institutional 
arrangements.  There is nothing to suggest that these are issues that 
will become less important in a world that in the years since the 
publication of Liberalism against populism has seen still more 
countries move towards democracy. 
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Table 1. The 2009 Romanian presidential election: Summary of votes and vote shares. 
Candidate Party 
1st round votes (share) 
(22 November 2009) 
2nd round (runoff) 
votes (share) 
(6 December 2009) 
Traian Basescu Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) 
3,153,640 (32.44%) 
(plurality winner) 
5,275,808 (50.33%) 
(runoff winner) 
Mircea Geoana 
Social Democratic Party (PSD) & Conservative 
Party (PC) 
3,027,838 (31.15%) 5,205,760 (49.66%) 
Crin Antonescu National Liberal Party (PNL) 1,945,831 (20.02%) - 
Corneliu V. Tudor Greater Romania Party 540,380 (5.56%) - 
Hunor Kelemen Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania 372,761 (3.83%) - 
Sorin Oprescu Independent  309,764 (3.18%) - 
George Becali New Generation Party 186,390 (1.91%) - 
Remus Cernea Green Party 60,539 (0.62%) - 
Constantin Rotaru Socialist Alliance Party 43,684 (0.45%) - 
Gheorghe-Eduard Manole Independent 34,189 (0.35%) - 
Ovidiu-Cristian Iane Ecologist Party 22,515 (0.23%) - 
Constantin-Ninel Potirca Independent 21,306 (0.21%) - 
Totals  9,718,837 (100%) 10,481,568 (100%) 
Invalid votes  227,446 (2.28%) 138,476 (1.30%) 
Turn-out  54.4% 58.0% 
Sources: Smith 2009, corrected with data from Biroul Electoral Central (http://www.bec2009p.ro/rezultate.html). 
